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Abstract: In this study, we investigate whether neoclassical economic theory, capital market 
frictions or preference-based theory can explain investment behaviour in the Dutch beam trawler 
fishery in the North Sea. By presenting a number of estimations, we show that vessels conducting 
pulse fishing invest substantially more than similar vessels undertaking conventional fishing, even 
after controlling for differences in such variables as capital stock, prices, profits and quotas. One 
possible explanation for this result is that vessel owners may obtain a separate benefit from 
investing in pulse fishing.  
                                                            
1 This paper was prepared under the FP7 BENTHIS project (312088), but the conclusions do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the European Commission and do not anticipate the Commission's future policy in this area. 
1 Introduction. 
In this paper, we analyse investment behaviour in the fisheries sector. The motivation for the 
paper is the simple observation that the return on capital in many fisheries differs widely between 
fleet segments. As an example, the return on capital for various fleet segments in Dutch beam 
trawler fishery in the North Sea is shown in Table 1.2 
Table 1: Average return on capital in the Dutch beam trawler fishery in the North Sea, 2009-2015.  
 Vessels 
below 12 
metres 
Vessels 
between 12 
and 18 
metres 
Vessels 
between 18 
and 24 
metres 
Vessels 
above 40 
metres 
Return on 
capital (%) 
9.8 15.66 21.20 46.20 
Source: Own calculations based on Anon (2016). 
From Table 1 we see that the return on capital increases with vessel size. For small vessels, the 
return is in line with the return in other sectors of the economy, whereas the return is huge for 
very large commercial vessels. A positive relationship between vessel size and return on capital 
has also been observed in many other fisheries in the European Union (see e.g., STECF, 2017). 
The numbers in Table 1 can be related to three strands of economic literature on investments. The 
first strand of literature can be labelled conventional neoclassical investment theory, and 
according to that theory, investments should be undertaken until the return on capital is identical 
between fleet segments.3 Thereby, neoclassical theory predicts that differences in investments 
can be explained by a set of key economic variables such as output prices, input prices, interest 
rates, capital stock, depreciation rate and marginal product of capital. A number of empirical 
papers within fisheries economics explain variations in investment levels between vessels and/or 
fleet segments using these variables.4 However, as the numbers in Table 1 indicate, conventional 
neoclassical theory may provide a poor explanation for actual investment behaviour in fisheries.  
                                                            
2 In this paper we define the return on capital as the interest costs shared by the capital stock measured by the 
replacement value (see sections 3.2 and 3.3 below). As an alternative the return could be defined as the profit shared 
by the capital stock. 
3 It is often argued that huge integration on international capital markets implies that the return on capital is 
approximately identical between countries and industries (see e.g. Campbell et al, 1999). 
4 See e.g. Squires et al. (1994), Campbell et al. (1999), Brandt (2007), Eythorsson (1996), Nostbakken (2012), Jensen et 
al. (2012), Flaaten et al. (1995), Guyader et al. (2003) and Daures et al. (2006). 
The second strand of literature can be labelled modern neoclassical investment theory. According 
to that theory, a number of capital market frictions exist such as market power, different firm 
sizes, different market prices, different costs, the use of mark-up pricing, the heterogeneity of 
firms, licenses (entry barriers), regulation, various forms of uncertainty, the sizes of sunk costs, 
irreversible investments, subsidies and adjustment costs of capital (see e.g., McLaney et al, 2004 
and Lee and Guthrie, 2010).5 For fisheries, examples of capital market frictions include differences 
in the regulatory regimes6, various forms of uncertainty7 and subsidies such as decommissioning 
schemes.8 By using a theoretical model, it can be shown that capital market frictions may cause 
differences in the return on capital between fleet segments, as in Table 1.9 Therefore, several 
empirical studies take capital market frictions into account when explaining differences in 
investment behaviour between fleet segments.10 
The third strand of literature can be labelled preference-based investment theory. Nostbakken et 
al. (2011) argue that differences in the investment behaviours between fleet segments may occur 
because of differences in preferences of vessel owners. This line of arguments can be traced back 
to Anderson (1980), who introduced a benefit of being a fisherman. The benefit captures that 
some fishermen will accept a low remuneration of production factors because the fishing activity 
itself provides them positive utility. This utility may arise because people enjoy working in nature 
or because some fishing methods are preferred over other methods due to, for example, 
perceived environmental friendliness. Anderson (1980) mentioned that the benefit of being a 
fisherman is higher for small vessels than for large vessels, which may explain the differences in 
the returns on capital in Table 1. 
In this paper, we undertake a first attempt to clarify which theory provides the best explanation 
for differences in investment levels between fleet segments, and in doing so, we use the Dutch 
                                                            
5 It can be argued that these variables be labelled market failures. However, we follow Boadway and Bruce (1984) and 
define market failures as public goods, uncertainty, asymmetric information, externalities and imperfect competition. 
With this definition, many of the above-mentioned variables cannot be denoted market failures.   
6 See e.g. Cauvin (1979). 
7 See e.g. Singh et al. (2005). 
8 See e.g. Clark et al. (2005). 
9 See e.g. Jensen et al. (2012). 
10 Capital market frictions are included in investment studies within fisheries by e.g. Squires et al. (1994), Campbell et 
al. (1999), Brandt (2007), Eythorsson (1996), Nostbakken (2012), Jensen et al. (2012), Flaaten et al. (1995), Gyader et 
al. (2003) and Daures et al. (2006). 
beam trawler fishery in the North Sea as an empirical case. In that fishery, vessels engage in pulse 
(electric) and conventional fishing, and we therefore have two separate fleet segments which 
operate in a multispecies flatfish fishery mainly targeting sole (Solea solea). Sole and other 
important species are regulated with individual transferable quotas (ITQs), and based on a 
theoretical model for investment behaviour under that kind of regulation we derive a number of 
variables that may determine the investments. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset 
covering 97 vessels for the period between 2009 and 201511, and we estimate several different 
specifications of the theoretical investment model. In all the estimations, we include a dummy 
variable to capture whether a vessel is undertaking pulse or conventional fishing (a pulse dummy) 
in order to try to capture preference-based variables. However, we also correct for a number of 
neoclassical variables and capital market frictions such as capital stock, prices, profits and quotas. 
We assume that pulse fishing generates a higher benefit of being a fisherman than conventional 
fishing, for example because it is perceived as being more environmentally friendly. In all the 
estimated models, the pulse dummy is highly statistically significant, whereas most of the 
neoclassical variables and capital market frictions are insignificant. The significance of the pulse 
dummy suggests that differences in the benefits of being a fisherman between pulse and 
conventional fishing may explain the differences in investments between the two fleet segments. 
However, despite the fact that we correct for differences in important neoclassical variables and 
capital market frictions such as profits (and costs)12, we cannot rule out that the significant pulse 
dummy is due to omitted variables. One example of an omitted neoclassical variable that may 
explain differences in investments is differences in expected future returns.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a theoretical investment 
model for fisheries, whereas section 3 contains descriptions of the fishery and the data. Section 4 
provides an overview of the empirical models estimated in our paper, and the results are 
presented in section 5. The study’s conclusions are presented in section 6.  
                                                            
11 Between 2009 and 2015, a transition in the Dutch beam trawler fishery in the North Sea occurred from conventional 
to pulse fishing (see Haasnoot et al., 2016). 
12 According to Hamon et al. (2018), the profit in the pulse fishery exceeds that in the conventional fishery and 
Turenhout et al. (2016) show that fuel costs are lower in the pulse fishery.  
2 Theoretical model of investments in fisheries. 
Two recent papers, those of Jensen et al. (2012) and Nostbakken (2012), derive theoretical 
investment models similar to ours. The model in Jensen et al. (2012) applies to a fishery that is 
regulated with individual non-transferable quotas (INTQs), whereas Nostbakken (2012) considers 
ITQ regulation. In Nostbakken (2012), long-run investment functions are derived because quota 
trading is considered as investments and dis-investments. However, there also exist a number of 
short-run motivations for quota trading13 such as unpredictable harvests above quotas, and 
therefore quota trading cannot always be considered an investment.14 Thus, by assuming short-
run motivations for quota trading, we contribute to the analysis in Nostbakken (2012). 
We also go beyond Nostbakken (2012) because we introduce two additional modelling features: a. 
contrary to Nostbakken (2012), the revenue and cost of selling and buying ITQs is included in the 
objective function (see e.g., Hanley et al, 1997), and b. contrary to Nostbakken (2012), a restriction 
on the development of quota capital over time is excluded from the model (see e.g., Jensen et al, 
2012). In the model, we assume that fishermen can always buy and sell quotas in the short-run15, 
implying that a quota restriction does not enter into the fisherman’s decision problem.  
As an additional difference compared to Nostbakken (2012) and Jensen et al. (2012), we assume 
that fleet segments (or vessels) differ with respect to a preference-based variable for investing. 
Specifically, we operate with a fleet-specific exogenous preference for investments in physical 
capital, i . We chose to include i  in the cost function for investments in physical capital, and we 
can therefore interpret this function as a perceived cost of investments.16 i  can be understood as 
a benefit of investing in a particular type of gear due to, for example, environmental friendliness. 
Nostbakken et al. (2011) argue that such factors can be important drivers of investments in 
fisheries. 
                                                            
13 See Hanley et al. (1997) for a discussion of short-run explanations for quota trading. 
14 It can be argued that two separate markets for short-run and long-run quota trading exist. However, in actual 
fisheries we cannot distinguish between these two markets so in this paper we assume that all quota trading is driven 
by short-run motivations. 
15 See e.g. Andersen et al. (2010) for a discussion. 
16 The results in the paper is not affected by the way i is included in the model.  
Turning to the model, the profit from investment in physical capital at a current time period, t, by 
fleet segment i17 can be expressed as18 
 ( ) ( , )it it it it it it ipY q Q Y wL c I      ,     (1) 
where it is the profit earned by fleet segment i at time t, p is a constant output price, Yit is the 
harvest by fleet segment i at time t, q is a constant price on quotas, Qit is the size of the quota 
initially distributed to fleet segment i at time t, w is a constant price of variable inputs, Lit is the 
amount of a variable inputs used fleet segment i at time t, Iit is the investments in physical capital 
by fleet segment i at time t, and ( , )it ic I   is the perceived costs of investments in physical capital.  
Note four facts in relation to (1). First, all variables and parameters on the right-hand side of (1) 
can be interpreted as vectors, implying that they may contain several variables and parameters. 
Second, ( , )it ic I   is not necessarily linear in Iit, implying that capital may be non-malleable (see 
e.g., Nostbakken, 2012). Third, we define i  such that the perceived costs of investments 
decrease if the exogenous preference-based variable increases ( 0
i
c




). Finally, (1) captures 
both net buyers and net sellers of quotas. If it itQ Y , the fleet segment is a net seller of quotas, 
and a revenue on ( )it itq Q Y  is earned from quota trading. Contrarily, provided it itQ Y , the fleet 
segment is a net buyer of quotas, and a cost on ( )it itq Q Y  is incurred from quota trading. 
Because investments in physical capital are long-run decisions, a dynamic model is needed. We 
assume discrete time and an infinite time horizon implying that the fisherman’s objective function 
becomes  
 
1
[ ( ( ) ( , ))t it it it it it i
t
MaxE pY q Q Y wL c I 


    ,   (2) 
                                                            
17 Note that we can let i represent both vessels and fleet segments, but we operate with fleet segments in our paper 
due to the nature of our dataset (see section 3 below).  
18 See Clark (1990) for an introduction to this model. 
where E is the expectation operator, and 
1
1 r
 

is a discount factor, in which r is the interest 
rate. Based on this definition, we let   be a measure for the interest rate below, and from this, it 
follows that r can be an important explanation for the level of investments in physical capital in 
fisheries. Remark, also, that fishermen maximize expected rather than actual discounted profit 
because the size of a fish stock is assumed to be a stochastic variable (see (5) below19).  
Equation (2) is maximized subject to three constraints. First, a dynamic restriction on the 
development in physical capital is introduced: 
 1(1 )it it itK I K       for 1,.....,t   ,  (3) 
where Kit is the capital stock for fleet segment i at time t, and  is a constant depreciation rate. (3) 
states that the physical capital of fleet segment i at time t is equal to the investments, itI , plus the 
capital left over from the previous time period 1(1 ) itK  . 
Second, we introduce a production function that summarizes the harvest technology of the fleet 
segment. Specifically, the production function relates inputs to outputs and can be formulated as 
 ( , , )it it it tY F L K S    1,.....,t   ,   (4) 
where St is the size of the fish stock at time t. Thus, according to (4), the output for a fleet segment 
at time t ( itY ) depends on the variable input, the capital stock and the fish stock.   
Finally, we take the development in the stock size over time into account. To keep the model 
simple, we follow Nostbakken (2012) and assume that the fish stock can be expressed as a mean 
reverting process given by20 
 
1 1( )t t t tS S S S z        1,.....,t   ,   (5) 
where S  is the mean stock size,   is the speed of adjustment in stock size and tz is a random 
variable with a mean of zero and constant variance (white noise). Note that because tz  is included 
                                                            
19 Other stochastic factors may affect the harvest in a fishery but the expectation operator in (2) can also cover these. 
20 See Conrad and Clark (1991) for a discussion of a mean reverting process. 
in (5), the fish stock (at time t) becomes a stochastic variable, which justifies why an expectation 
operator is included in (2). Thus, tS is the expected stock size at time t, and due to tz , the model 
takes stock uncertainty into account. Since we operate with a fisheries model, it can be argued 
that (5) should be disregarded as under open-access, but from (2), our model captures long-run 
behaviour of fishermen. In long-run investment models, it is often argued that fishermen take 
stock considerations into account (see e.g., Nostbakken, 2012).   
Thus, our problem is to maximize (2) subject to (3), (4) and (5) and since we have discrete time this 
is a dynamic programming problem. To solve the problem, we substitute the production function 
given by (4) and the dynamic capital equation given by (3) into (2), upon which the Bellman 
equation becomes21 
 
1
1 1 1 1 1
( , , ) ( , , ) ( ( , , ))
( (1 ) , ) ( ( , , , , )
it it it t it it t it it it t it
t
it it i it it it it it i
v K L S pF L K S q Q F L K S wL
c K K E v K L S K       
    
   
 
1 1
1
[ ( ( ) )]t t t t t
t
S S S S z 

 

    ,    (6) 
where t  is a Lagrange-multiplier in front of the stock restriction at time t. To understand (6), note 
that the first four terms represent current profit, and 1
1 1 1 1( ( , , , , )
t
it t t t t iE v K L S K 

   
 is the 
present value of the maximum expected profit in all future time periods.  
In (6), Kit, Lit, St and t  are selected as control variables, and the first-order conditions for these 
variables at a given point in time (t) become 
 0it i
it it it
v F F
p w q
L L L
  
   
  
,    (7) 
 1
( )
0it it
it it it it it
v E vF c F
p q
K K K K K
 
   
    
    
,   (8) 
                                                            
21 The Bellman equation decompose the total discounted profit into the current profit and the maximum value of 
discounted future profits, which is a well-known method for solving dynamic programming problems (see Conrad and 
Clark, 1991).  
 
1( 1) 0
it
t t
t t t
v F F
p q
S S S
   
  
     
  
, and   (9) 
 
1 1( ) 0
it
t t t t
t
v
S S S S z

 

     

.    (10) 
According to (7), the value of the marginal product of variable input (
it
F
p
L


) must equal its 
marginal costs. The marginal costs consist of the constant price of the input ( iw ) and the marginal 
opportunity cost of holding quotas (
it
F
q
L


). From (8), the marginal profit of capital at a given point 
in time is equal to the current value of the expected marginal profit of capital in future time 
periods ( 1
( )it
it
E v
K
 


). The marginal profit of capital consists of the value of the marginal product of 
capital (
it
F
p
K


), the perceived marginal cost of investments (
it
c
K


) and the marginal opportunity 
of holding quotas (
it
F
q
K


). According to (9), the net value of the marginal product of stock size at 
a given point in time (
t t
F F
p q
S S
 

 
) should equal the change in marginal profit due to stock size in 
future time periods represented by 1( 1)t t     .
22 Finally, (10) is the restriction on the stock size 
described by (5). 
(7), (8), (9) and (10) can be solved to find optimal values for Kit, Lit, St and t , which we label 
*
itK , 
*
itL , 
*
tS  and 
*
t , respectively. 
*
itK , 
*
itL , 
*
tS  and 
*
t  will depend on all the constant (time 
independent) parameter values in the model ( , , , , ,iq w p     and  ) and due to the recursive 
nature of the model, the optimal solutions will also depend on all future values of the relevant 
variables. However, we assume adaptive expectations, so instead of future values, we use lagged 
                                                            
22 Due to the mean reverting process describing the development in the stock size in (5), the change in marginal profit 
in future time periods is included because harvesting one unit of fish now implies lower stock sizes in future time 
periods. 
values of the variables.23 The lagged variables can be treated as exogenous, and, for simplicity, we 
assume that the maximum number of lags included in the model is one. These considerations 
imply that *
itK ,
*
itL ,
*
tS  and 
*
t  also depend on 1 1 1 1 1, , , , , ,it t t it t t tK S L Q Q z      and 1tz  .  
*
itK , 
*
itL  and 
*
tS  can now be inserted into (4) to obtain the optimal harvest of a fleet segment (
*
itY ), 
and *
itY  will also depend on the parameter values and lagged variable. 
*
itK  can also be inserted into 
the dynamic capital constraint in (3) (given by 1(1 )it it itI K K    ), so the optimal level of 
investments in physical capital becomes 
 * * 1 1 1 1 1 1( , , , , , , , , , , , , , , )it it it t it it t t t t iI I K S L Q Q z z q w p          .  (11) 
(11) is the theoretical investment relation we depart from in this paper, and two facts are 
important in relation to (11). First, i enters into the cost function for investments, and because 
we assume that 0
i
c




, we obtain that 
*
0it
i
I




. Thus, an increase in the exogenous preference-
based variable will increase the level of investments. Second, in (11), the harvest ( itY ), lagged 
capital stock ( 1itK  ), lagged fish stock ( 1tS  ), lagged variable input ( 1tL  ), lagged shadow price on 
stock size ( 1it  ), output price (p), input price (w), interest rate (  ), stock adjustment factor ( ) 
and depreciation factor (  ) represent neoclassical variables. i  captures a vessel-specific 
preference-based variable, whereas the quota ( tQ and 1tQ  ), price on quotas ( q ) and size of stock 
uncertainty ( tz and 1tz  ) can be interpreted as capital market frictions. 
3 Fishery and data. 
3.1 A description of the Dutch beam trawler fishery in the North Sea. 
In this paper, we use the Dutch beam trawler fishery in the North Sea as an empirical case. 
Approximately 60 vessels larger than 40 metres participate in this fishery, and the fishery is very 
important for the Netherlands. In 2012, the fleet “produced” 20% of the total fishing effort in the 
                                                            
23 Adaptive expectations cover that a current value of a variable is explained by lagged values of the variable. 
Operating with adaptive expectations in investment models for fisheries is a common practice in the literature (see 
e.g. Nostbakken, 2012 and Jensen et al, 2012).   
Dutch fisheries industry and generated 20% of the employment (see Anon, 2016). The Dutch beam 
trawler vessels in the North Sea mainly target sole and plaice because those two species account 
for approximately 80% of the total landings of all species (see Anon, 2016). Plaice represents 60% 
of the landings in volume but only accounts for 26% of the landing value (see Anon, 2016). In 
contrast, sole only represents 19% of the landing in volume but 54% of the landing value (see 
Anon, 2016). In this paper, we will use sole as the main targeted species in single-species models, 
but we also investigate multi-species models in which the harvest of all species, including plaice, is 
included. 
The vessels in the Dutch beam trawler fishery in the North Sea mainly undertake pulse and 
conventional fishing24, and in this paper, we will distinguish between those two kinds of fishing. 
Conventional fishing is described in numerous papers, and it is well-known that this method may 
cause damage to biogenic structures at the bottom of the sea because mechanical stimulation 
(ticker chains) is used to chase flatfish out of the seabed (see e.g., Collie et al, 2000 and Kaiser et 
al, 2006). Thus, considerable effort has been devoted to developing pulse fishing, in which electric 
stimulation is used as an alternative to mechanical stimulation (see e.g., Collie et al, 2000 and 
Kaiser et al, 2006). Specifically, the heavy ticker chains used in conventional fishing are replaced 
with lightweight electrodes.  
From the middle of the 1980s and up until the middle of the 2000s, pulse fishing was illegal within 
the European Union. However, in 2008, the Dutch government provided subsidies for investments 
in 5 trial vessels undertaking pulse fishing, and since then, pulse fishing has increased in popularity 
(see e.g., Haasnoot et al, 2016). In 2014, approximately 80 vessels were allowed to undertake 
pulse fishing in the North Sea, but to undertake pulse fishing, vessels have to apply for a license, 
which are randomly allocated to some of the vessels applying for a permit (see e.g., Haasnoot et 
al, 2016). Despite an increasing number of studies25, the true environmental impacts of pulse 
fishing are not yet fully understood, but several studies indicate that fishermen perceive pulse 
fishing as more environmentally friendly than conventional fishing because of the use of electronic 
                                                            
24 Conventional fishing is represented by traditional trawling and trawling by sumwing. 
25 See van Beek et al. (1990), de Haan et al. (2016), Desender et al. (2017a), Desender et al. (2017b), ICES (2017), 
Soetaert et al. (2015), Soetaert et al. (2016a), Soetaert et al. (2016b), Soetaert et al. (2016c), Soetaert et al. (2016d) 
and van der Reijden et al. (2017). 
simulation instead of the heavy tickler chains (see Jennings and Kaiser, 1998, Polet and Depestle, 
2010, van Marlen et al 2014 and Turenhout et al, 2016). In addition, pulse fishing also increases 
the profits in the fishery because fuel costs are reduced due to the use of electric instead of 
mechanic stimulation (see Hamon et al, 2018 and Turenhout et al, 2016).26 Furthermore, as 
indicated by Jennings and Kaiser (1998) and Polet and Depestle (2010), vessel owners expect 
higher future returns when conducting pulse instead of conventional fishing.    
3.2 Investments. 
For the Dutch beam trawler fishery in the North Sea, we have a panel dataset from Anon (2016) 
that covers a population of 97 vessels fishing for the period between 2009 and 2015, and in that 
period, the number of vessels undertaking pulse fishing increased. The dependent variable in our 
models is the total investments in physical capital which, in the dataset, is decomposed into three 
categories: a. the value of all investments in hulls, motors and gear that are related to the pulse 
fishery, b. the value of small investments that are not related to hulls, motors and gear or to the 
pulse fishery, and c. the value of large investments in hulls, motors and gear that are not related to 
the pulse fishery. To obtain a measure of the total investments in physical capital, we aggregated 
the investments in these three categories. Note that because a., b. and c. will vary between 
vessels and years, our measure of investments will do the same. 
In Table 2 below, we present summary statistics for the size of the total investments covering all 
years and all vessels.  
From Table 2, we see that for vessels conducting both pulse and conventional fishing, the mean 
value of the investments is low, but the mean value of the investments is much higher for vessels 
conducting pulse rather than conventional fishing.  
  
                                                            
26 Based on our dataset, we are able to show that the profit in the pulse fishery generates a significant higher profit 
than in the conventional fishery. Thereby, we can confirm the results in Hamon et al. (2018) and Turenhout et al. 
(2016). . 
Table 2: Summary statistics for the Dutch beam trawler fishery in the North Sea, 2009-2015.  
  Pulse fishing Conventional fishing 
 Measurement 
units 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
derivation 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
derivation 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
Dependent 
variable 
           
Investments 1000 Euro 79 71.87 95.85 0.00 374.50 135 23.91 52.12 0.00 431.00 
Neoclassical 
variables 
           
Capital stock 1000 Euro 79 640.68 527.72 71.42 2,194.60 135 280.10 403.86 22.88 2,234.23 
Total harvest  Tons 79 451.20 147.41 123.47 1,111.08 135 236.02 229.46 21.28 893.38 
Price on all 
harvest 
1000 Euro/tons 79 4.29 0.96 2.46 6.89 135 3.37 0.66 1.49 4.70 
Total harvest of 
sole 
Tons 79 125.09 43.12 3.07 229.32 135 10.83 30.95 0.00 151.22 
Price on sole 1000 Euro/tons 79 9.74 1.16 7,58 12.55 135 9.85 2.14 6.22 17.02 
Interest rate % 79 3.12 3.17 1.43 21.27 135 3.46 4.30 0.68 23.77 
Capital market 
frictions 
           
Quota of all 
species  
Tons 79 383.08 249.95 1.68 1,432.09 135 89.18 163.92 0.00 634.48 
Quota price on all 
species 
 79 5.64 1.59 0.27 9.33 97 6.57 2.38 1.17 16.13 
Quota of sole Tons 79 70.18 36.39 0.42 151.82 135 12.72 25.68 0.00 104.38 
Quota price on 
sole 
 79 20.51 6.32 12 28 95 18.15 6.33 12 28 
Preference based 
variable 
           
Pulse dummy 0 or 1 79 1.00 0.00 1 1 135 0 0 0 0 
Additional 
variables 
           
Profit 1000 Euro 79 229.72 244.28 -420.90 791.21 135 71.15 106.51 -262.34 419.19 
Construction year Year 79 1,995 5.96 1980 2004 134 1,976 19.41 1923 2007 
Vessel tonnage 1000 gross 
tonnage 
79 0.40 0.14 0.09 0.56 135 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.55 
Source: Own calculations based on Anon (2016). 
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3.3 Neoclassical variables.  
To capture the neoclassical variables, we include a. the capital stock, b. the harvest of all species, 
c. the harvest of sole, d. the ex-vessel price of all species, e. the ex-vessel price of sole and f. the 
interest rate. We measure variable a. with the replacement value, which was calculated by Anon 
(2016) using hull age and construction year. We have information about b. and c. directly from the 
dataset, and when using b. (and d.) in a model, we impose a multi-species assumption, whereas 
the use of c. (and e.) represents a single-species assumption. Concerning d. and e., we have 
information about the revenue from each vessel’s harvest, and by dividing that with the harvest, 
we obtain the unit value, which serves as our proxy for the price. Note that this calculation 
procedure leads to prices that differ between vessels as well as years. Our measure of f. is the 
total interest costs divided by the capital stock (replacement value), and in this way, the interest 
rate will also vary between vessels and years.  
From Table 2, we see that the mean value of the capital stock, the harvest of all species and the 
harvest of sole are higher for vessels undertaking pulse instead of conventional fishing. 
Conversely, the price of all species, the price of sole and the interest rate were almost identical for 
pulse and conventional fishing. By looking at the minimum and maximum values, it appears that 
there are numerous variations in the observations for the capital stock and the total harvest of all 
species. Finally, from the minimum values, we observe that all observations of the neoclassical 
variables are positive. 
3.4 Capital market frictions. 
To capture capital market frictions, we include a. the quota on all species, b. the quota on sole, c. 
the quota price on all species and d. the quota price on sole. In relation to a. and b., we have 
information about these variables directly from the dataset; a. represents a multi-species 
assumption, whereas b. captures a single-species assumption. For c. and d., we have information 
about the value of the holding of quotas such that a quota price can be calculated by dividing that 
value by the quota. Thus, we obtain in principle a vessel and year specific quota price, but due to 
the way the value of the quota on sole is defined in Anon (2016), there is no variation in d. 
between vessels (see Table 2), whereas c. will vary between vessels.    
From Table 2, we see that the mean values of both the quota of all species and the quota of sole 
are high, and the same holds for the two quota prices. Furthermore, the mean values of the 
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quotas on both all species and sole are higher in the pulse than in the conventional fishery. Finally, 
all the observations for the capital market frictions were positive.   
3.5 A preference-based variable. 
To clarify whether preference-based theory can explain investments in the Dutch beam trawler 
fishery in the North Sea, we include a pulse dummy with a value on 1 if a vessel undertakes pulse 
fishing and a value of 0 if conventional fishing is conducted. If the parameter in front of the pulse 
dummy turns out to be positive and significant in the estimated models, this means that vessels 
undertaking pulse fishing invest more than similar vessels conducting conventional fishing. Since 
we control for factors that ought to influence the investment level, a positive and significant pulse 
dummy may suggest that a preference-based variable (the benefit of being a pulse fisherman) is 
an important determinant of investments. This finding may be observed because pulse fishing is 
perceived as more environmentally friendly by vessel owners than conventional fishing, even 
though scientific information on this issue is incomplete (see section 3.1).  
3.6 Additional variables. 
In line with the empirical literature on investments in fisheries, we include three additional 
variables in our regression models, which are, however, not derived from the theoretical model in 
section 2: a. vessel construction year; b. vessel size and c. a measure of profit in the pulse and 
conventional fisheries. In relation to a., Jensen et al. (2012) finds that vessel construction year is 
important for the sizes of investments, and we therefore take this variable into account in the 
estimations.27 For b., we measure this variable with vessel tonnage, and here Nostbakken (2012) 
finds that vessel tonnage is important when explaining investments in fisheries. Regarding c., we 
mentioned in section 3.1 that pulse fishery generates a considerably higher profit than 
conventional fishery, and following Nostbakken et al. (2011), it is useful to include a measure for 
the profit of each vessel.28   
                                                            
27 Because these variables are not derived from the theoretical model, we are not interested in predicting the signs of 
the coefficients in front of them. However, we will expect that a. a lower construction year (an older vessel) implies 
higher investments, b. a higher tonnage implies higher investments and c. a higher profit generates a higher 
investment. 
28 Note that neoclassical theory will imply that the marginal profit is identical between fleet segments and, therefore, 
we choose to label the profit of vessels as an additional variable, although it can also be interpreted as a neoclassical 
variable (and a capital market friction). 
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By looking at Table 2, we can confirm that the profit is higher in the pulse fishery than in the 
conventional fishery and that there are a large number of observations with negative profits in the 
dataset (approximately 100 observations).  
4 Empirical models.  
From section 2, we have that *
itK , 
*
itL , 
*
tS  and 
*
t  could be found by solving four equations with 
four unknowns and that *
itK , 
*
itL , 
*
tS  and 
*
t  will depend on the parameter values and lagged 
values of the variables included in the model. Furthermore, *
itK can be inserted into (3) to find the 
investment function in (11), but instead of using that procedure, we depart directly from (11). 
However, this may cause endogeneity problems due to the existence of *
itK , 
*
itL , 
*
tS  and 
*
t , but 
to minimize the endogeneity problems, we may consider including itL , itK , tS  and it  directly in 
(15) as an approximation. Regarding Kit, it is natural to include this variable because capital stock is 
closely related to investment throughout the dynamic capital constraint in (3). With respect to Lit, 
we must expect that there is low variation in this variable over time and between the vessels. For 
the fish stock, there is no variation in the variable between vessels and a low variation between 
years. Therefore, excluding the variable input and fish stock seems reasonable despite the 
problems with endogeneity.29 Regarding it , this variable is unobserved, so this shadow price 
must be omitted from the model, and 1,t tz z   and   are also relegated to the error term 
because they are unobservable. Furthermore, we have no information regarding input price, 
depreciation rate and stock adjustment factor, and therefore those parameters must also be 
excluded. Finally, because capital stock is included in the estimations, it is also useful to take the 
harvest ( itY ) into account. Therefore, in total, we reach the following investment function, which 
can be estimated using our dataset:  
 1( , , , , , , , )it it it it it t iI I K K Y Q p q   .    (12) 
                                                            
29 Due to the variations in the variable input and fish stock between years, it can be argued that yearly dummies 
should have been included in the estimations. However, we have been estimating our models by including yearly 
dummies, and in all the estimated models, the year dummies turned out to be insignificant. Therefore, we have 
chosen to report our results without yearly dummies.   
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By using the considerations below (11) in relation to (12), the capital stock ( itK and 1itK  ), the 
harvest ( itY ), output price (p) and interest rate (  ) represent neoclassical variables, and the i  
capture the preference-based variables. Finally, the quota ( tQ ) and the price on quotas ( q ) can be 
interpreted as capital market frictions. Furthermore, we will expect that vessels undertaking pulse 
fishing invest more than vessels conducting conventional fishing, implying that 0it
i
I




.  
To discuss whether neoclassical variables, capital market frictions or preference-based variables 
explain investments in the Dutch beam trawler fishery in the North Sea, we conduct a first-order 
approximation of the general investment model in (12). Based on that approximation, we have 
estimated two different models given by 
1
1
*
n
it j ijt ijt i
j
I a b PS c x f e 

        (model 1),   (13)
1 1
1 1
*
n n
it j ijt j ijt ijt i
j j
I a b PS c x d x f e 
 
         (model 2),  (14) 
where a, b, cj, dj and f are estimated parameters, xijt are explanatory variables, 1ijtx   are the lagged 
values of explanatory variables, PS is the pulse dummy, 
1ijt  is the lagged value of the profit, and ei 
is a random error term. In the following, we refer to xijt as the non-lagged variable, whereas 1ijtx   is 
a lagged variable, and in model 1, we assume that all the variables, apart from the profit, are non-
lagged. This is consistent with a situation where all the variables are in steady-state equilibrium30, 
but based on the theoretical model in section 2, an assumption about an absence of lags does not 
seem reasonable. Therefore, we extend model 1 to allow for lagged variables, and we label this 
model 2. In (12), we only include the lagged value of the capital stock, but in the estimations, we 
determined the variables on which a lag was introduced according to significance. This implies that 
we include lags on the capital stock, the interest rate, the quota and the quota price.  
From section 3.1, we have that pulse and conventional fishing profits differ. However, from a 
statistical point of view, it is problematic to include the profit in an investment function because 
                                                            
30 See e.g. Clark (1990). 
18 
 
the profit and investments ((13) or (14)) are simultaneously determined, implying that the profit is 
endogenous. To solve this problem, we include the lagged profit (
1ijt  ) in (13) and (14)
31, and by 
doing so, we assume that past profits are unaffected by present profits.32   
In relation to (13) and (14), we must also decide whether to estimate the models with levels or 
logarithmic values of the variables. In this instance, it is important that the profit is negative for 
approximately 100 observations in the dataset (see Table 2) and that the profit is higher for pulse 
than for conventional fishing. Since the logarithmic function is undefined for negative numbers, 
this implies that a logarithmic specification of all variables in (13) and (14) will underestimate the 
difference in investments between pulse and conventional fishing because the observations with 
negative profits mainly arose for vessels undertaking the latter.33 Another option is to take the 
logarithmic value of all variables apart from the profit, but we prefer to measure all variables in 
(13) and (14) in the same units. Thus, we chose to estimate (13) and (14) by using the variables in 
levels.      
In the estimation of the two models, we also have to decide whether to impose a single-species or 
multi-species assumption. Here, we chose to present results departing from both assumptions, 
which implies that we estimate two versions of both model 1 and 2: a. estimation of (13) and (14) 
using output price, quantity, quota price and quota of all fish species corresponding to an 
assumption of a multi-species fishery and b. estimation of (13) and (14) using output price, 
quantity, quota price and quota of sole corresponding to an assumption of a single-species fishery. 
Furthermore, because we have a panel dataset, it is also possible to control for vessel-specific 
fixed effects. For that reason, we estimated each specification of models 1 and 2 by a. ordinary 
least squares (labelled Pooled) and b. vessel-specific fixed effects (labelled Within). We test for 
whether vessel-specific fixed effect arises with an FE-test. 
In (13) and (14), we only allow vessels undertaking pulse and conventional fishing to differ with 
respect to the constant term. However, the two groups of vessels might also differ with respect to 
                                                            
31 Another solution to the problem with endogeneity is to use instrument variable estimation but this requires that 
suitable instruments can be found, and we have not been able to do this for our dataset. 
32 Another argument for including the lagged profit is that investment is affected by past profits and not present 
profits. 
33 We have tried to estimate our models by using logarithmic values of the variables, and when doing so, the pulse 
dummy becomes insignificant in all models.  
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the coefficients to the explanatory variables. To test for this kind of structural differences between 
pulse and conventional fishery, we carried out a Chow-test for equality of the coefficients to the 
explanatory variables between the two groups of vessels.34 Such structural differences between 
fleet segments are normally not discussed in investment models within fisheries. In the theoretical 
model in section 2, structural differences will imply that the pulse and conventional fisheries have 
separate investment functions.  
A potential problem with our regressions is that self-selection bias may arise because the 
fishermen decide whether or not to undertake pulse fishing. If the factors that influence the 
decision to undertake pulse fishing also influence the level of investments, then the pulse dummy 
is endogenous. However, we believe that self-selection bias has had a minor impact on our results 
because vessels have to apply for a license before pulse fishing can be conducted, and the licenses 
are randomly allocated among fishermen who apply for the fishing rights (see section 3.1).  
5 Results. 
5.1 Model 1. 
The results from estimating the two specifications of model 1 are reported in Tables 3 and 4.  
  
                                                            
34 See Johnston and DiNardu (1997) for a discussion of the Chow-test.   
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Table 3: Estimation results under a multi-species assumption.   
 Pooled Within 
Constant term 119.006 
(528.264) 
 
Neoclassical variables   
Capital stock 0.004 
(0.012) 
0.019 
(0.027) 
Total harvest  -0.022 
(0.041) 
-0.044 
(0.105) 
Price on all harvest -5.951 
(6.721) 
-8.649 
(8.887) 
Interest rate 0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
Capital market frictions   
Quota of all species  -0.023 
(0.044) 
-0.230 
(0.144) 
Quota price on all 
species 
 
1.868 
(1.934) 
1.901 
(3.891) 
Preference based 
variables 
  
Pulse dummy 51.254*** 
(15.376) 
79.122*** 
(27.607) 
Additional variables   
Lagged profit 0.011 
(0.037) 
0.108 
(0.072) 
Construction year -0.050 
(0.265) 
-7.726*** 
(2.665) 
Vessel tonnage 118.493*** 
(45.654) 
700.471* 
(385.383) 
Statistical tests and 
information 
  
Chow test (p-value) 0.006 0.001 
FE test (p-value)  0.91 
R2 0.179 0.113 
Observations 269 269 
Note: * indicates p <0.1; ** indicates p < 0.05; *** indicates p < 0.01. 
Source: Own estimations.   
21 
 
Table 4: Estimation results under a single-species assumption.  
 Pooled Within 
Constant term -373.994 
(1108.953) 
 
Neoclassical variables   
Capital stock 0.005 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.037) 
Total harvest of sole -0.555** 
(0.276) 
-1.285*** 
(0.538) 
Price on sole  4.501* 
(2.639) 
2.655 
(3.491) 
Interest rate 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.00002 
(0.001) 
Capital market frictions   
Quota of sole   0.049 
(0.260) 
-1.762** 
(0.812) 
Quota price on sole  -0.462 
(0.760) 
-3.068*** 
(1.184) 
Preference based 
variables 
  
Pulse dummy 72.404*** 
(16.865) 
108.671*** 
(27.598) 
Additional variables   
Lagged profit 0.032 
(0.043) 
0.104 
(0.067) 
Construction year 0.171 
(0.564) 
-5.873** 
(2.849) 
Vessel tonnage 165.772** 
(64.507) 
1894.051*** 
(607.196) 
Statistical tests and 
information 
  
Chow test (p-value) 0.089 0.045 
FE test (p-value)  0.73 
R2 0.180 0.211 
Observations 200 200 
Note: * indicates p <0.1; ** indicates p < 0.05; *** indicates p < 0.01. 
Source: Own estimations.   
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Let us first discuss the signs of the coefficients to the neoclassical variables in Tables 3 and 4. 
Regarding capital stock, we have two counteracting effects regarding its influence on investments: 
a. a high capital stock indicates a high return on capital, making investments more profitable and 
b. a high capital stock implies that less investment are needed to reach a target capital stock. The 
positive coefficients to the capital stock in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that the former effect 
dominates the latter. Concerning the total harvest of all species (the multi-species models in Table 
3), there are also two counteracting effects: a. an increase in the harvest may indicate high 
profitability from fishing, leading to higher investments and b. an increase in the harvest leads to a 
decrease in the fish stock, implying lower investments. The negative coefficients to the total 
harvest indicate that explanation b. dominates a. When looking at the harvest in the single-species 
models (the harvest of sole in Table 4), we also obtain a negative coefficient, and the explanation 
for that result is the same as for the multi-species model. For the output price in the multi-species 
model, the sign of the coefficient is negative in Table 3, but this seems to be an unexpected result. 
However, in a multi-species fishery an increase in the average price may imply that fish of higher 
value is harvested which make investments less necessary. In the single-species model in Table 4, 
the sign of the coefficient to the output price is positive, which is as expected because a price 
increase leads to an increase in the profitability of the harvest. For the interest rate, we obtained 
ambiguous signs in the models. In Pooled in Table 3, the sign of the coefficient to the interest rate 
is positive, whereas the signs were negative in the three other models. This difference in the signs 
is probably because the interest rate was calculated as the interest costs divided by the capital 
stock (see section 3.2). Thereby, an increase in the interest rate can reflect both an increase in the 
interest costs and a decrease in the capital stock. 
For the capital market friction, the sign of the quota coefficient is negative in three out of the four 
models (see Tables 3 and 4). An explanation for this result is that an increase in a quota can have 
counteracting effects on investments depending on whether a vessel is a net buyer or net seller of 
quotas. Concerning the quota price, this variable had a positive effect on the investments in three 
out of the four models, and as for the quota, the effect of the quota price on investments depends 
on whether the vessel is a net buyer or seller of quotas. To summarize the above considerations, 
the signs in front of the included neoclassical variables and capital market frictions seem to be 
reasonable for the models without lagged variables.   
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Turning to the statistical significance of the neoclassical variables and capital market frictions, 
none of the variables is significant in the multi-species models in Table 3. In the singles-species 
models in Table 4, the total harvest of sole is significant at a 5%-level in Pooled and at a 1%-level in 
Within. Furthermore, both the quota and quota price on sole are significant in Within in Table 4. 
Regarding the additional variables, vessel tonnage is significant in all models (at a 1%-5% or 10% 
level), and construction year is significant in both Within models in Tables 3 and 4. Finally, slightly 
surprisingly, the lagged value of the profit only has an insignificant effect on investments. Thus, 
the overall conclusion is that the neoclassical variables, the capital market frictions and additional 
variables provide a poor explanation for investment behaviour in the Dutch beam trawler fishery 
in the North Sea.  
By looking at the pulse dummy in Tables 3 and 4, we observe that this variable is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all models. From sections 2 and 3, the pulse dummy can be 
interpreted as an exogenous preference-based variable for investing in the pulse fishery. Thus, if 
we correct for the influence of several neoclassical variables and capital market frictions that 
potentially can affect the dependent variable, the investments are higher in the pulse fishery than 
in the conventional fishery. This conclusion can be strengthened by looking at the economic 
significance of the pulse dummy in Tables 3 and 4. Because the investments are measured in 1000 
EURO, the coefficient in front of the pulse dummy indicates that vessels undertaking pulse fishing, 
on average, invest between 56,786 EURO and 133,228 EURO more than vessels conducting 
conventional fishing. Thus, from an economic perspective, the investments are significant higher 
in the pulse fishery than in the conventional fishery. In total, these observations lead to the 
conclusion that fishermen may obtain a separate benefit from investing in the pulse fishery. 
However, we cannot rule out that omitted neoclassical variables and capital market frictions can 
explain the positive and highly significant pulse dummy. Specifically, the pulse dummy can capture 
differences in the expectations to future return between pulse and conventional fishing.  
Four additional results can be mentioned in relation to Tables 3 and 4. First, R2 is fairly low in all 
the models in Tables 3 and 4, implying that only a minor part of the variation in the investments is 
explained. Second, from Tables 3 and 4, we observe that the p-value of the FE-test is very high in 
both the multi-species and single-species models. Thus, despite the fact that we have a panel 
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dataset, it is reasonable to operate with a common constant term for all vessels (apart from the 
pulse dummy). Third, as mentioned in section 4, we have also performed a Chow-test for all the 
models to determine whether the coefficients to the explanatory variables differ between pulse 
and conventional fishing. The p-values for this test are also reported in Tables 3 and 4, and in all 
models, the p-value is so low35 that it can be concluded that the estimated coefficients differ 
between the pulse and conventional fishery. Thus, structural differences in the investment 
functions between the vessels undertaking pulse and conventional fishing may exist. Finally, we 
have not investigated whether the vessels conducting pulse fishing invest more because of the 
gear used or because they invest more in general. To investigate this issue, we have estimated all 
the models by using non-pulse related investments instead of total investments including pulse 
related investments. In these estimations, the pulse dummy turns out to be insignificant, which 
indicates that vessels conducting pulse fishing may invest more because of the gear used.      
5.2 Model 2. 
A potential problem with the estimations in Tables 3 and 4 is that we have not included lagged 
variables, but according to the theoretical model from section 2, they ought to be taken into 
account. For that reason, we have included lags in capital stock, interest rate, quota and quota 
price. As mentioned in section 4, we have chosen the variables for which lagged values are 
included according to significance, and the estimation results are presented in Tables 5 and 6.   
  
                                                            
35 0.006 and 0.001 in the multi-species model in Table 3 and 0.089 and 0.045 in the single-species model in Table 4. 
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Table 5: Estimation results under a multi-species assumption.  
 Pooled Within 
Constant term -45.087 
(612.059) 
 
Neoclassical variables   
Non-lagged capital stock 0.120 
(0.150) 
0.352 
(0.321) 
Lagged capital stock -0.108 
(0.141) 
-0.333 
(0.329) 
Total harvest  -0.022 
(0.040) 
-0.072 
(0.089) 
Price on all harvest -5.970 
(6.989) 
-7.173 
(8.626) 
Non-lagged interest rate 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.0004 
(0.001) 
Lagged interest rate -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Capital market frictions   
Non-lagged quota of all 
species  
-0.195 
(0.119) 
-0.744*** 
(0.275) 
Lagged quota of all 
species 
0.244* 
(0.143) 
0.631** 
(0.286) 
Non-lagged 1quota price 
on all species 
-0.951 
(2.384) 
-3.287 
(4.301) 
Lagged quota price on all 
species 
5.700** 
(2.316) 
7.333* 
(2.988) 
Preference based 
variables 
  
Pulse dummy 56.786*** 
(14.405) 
81.495*** 
(23.048) 
Additional variables   
Lagged profit -0.012 
(0.043) 
0.077 
(0.073) 
Construction year 0.026 
(0.307) 
-3.841 
(4.685) 
Vessel tonnage 93.155** 
(46.135) 
771.292** 
(373.920) 
Statistical tests and 
information 
  
Chow test (p-value) 0.001 0.003 
FE test (p-value)  0.73 
R2 0.202 0.175 
Observations 268 268 
Note: * indicates p <0.1; ** indicates p < 0.05; *** indicates p < 0.01. 
Source: Own estimations. 
26 
 
Table 6: Estimation results under a single-species assumption.  
 Pooled Within 
Constant term -710.872 
(1124.158) 
 
Neoclassical variables   
Non-lagged capital stock 0.171 
(0.158) 
0.266 
(0.531) 
Lagged capital stock -0.154 
(0.147) 
-0.254 
(0.537) 
Total harvest of sole -0.538** 
(0.243) 
-1.474*** 
(0.343) 
Price on sole  3.268 
(3.694) 
3.529 
(5.481) 
Non-lagged Interest rate 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
Lagged interest rate -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Capital market frictions   
Non-lagged quota of sole   -0.101 
(0.458) 
-1.646 
(1.128) 
Lagged quota of sole 0.175 
(0.328) 
2.816*** 
(0.814) 
Non-lagged quota price 
on sole  
-1.556 
(3.217) 
-4.416 
(4.755) 
Lagged quota price on 
sole 
1.995 
(4.721) 
2.866 
(6.864) 
Preference based 
variables 
  
Pulse dummy 72.784*** 
(16.888) 
133.228*** 
(22.256) 
Additional variables   
Lagged profit 0.022 
(0.045) 
0.120* 
(0.062) 
Construction year 0.345 
(0.573) 
-2.496 
(4.424) 
Vessel tonnage 169.539*** 
(59.193) 
1528.295** 
(645.655) 
Statistical tests and 
information 
  
Chow test (p-value) 0.068 0.005 
FE test (p-value)  0.33 
R2 0.186 0.277 
Observations 200 200 
Note: * indicates p <0.1; ** indicates p < 0.05; *** indicates p < 0.01. 
Source: Own estimations.  
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Regarding the sign of the estimated coefficients to the neoclassical variables, a positive coefficient 
is obtained for the non-lagged capital stock, and a negative coefficient is reached for the lagged 
value of this variable. The former is explained by the fact that a high capital stock indicates a high 
return on capital, making investments more profitable, whereas the latter captures that a high 
capital stock indicates that less investments are needed to reach a target stock of capital. 
Regarding the interest rate, the sign of the coefficient to the non-lagged variable is positive in all 
models in Tables 5 and 6, whereas the lagged variable is negative. As mentioned in connection 
with Tables 3 and 4, this is probably due to the way the interest rate is calculated. 
Regarding capital market frictions, the sign of the coefficient to the non-lagged quota is negative, 
whereas the sign of the lagged quota is positive in both the multi-species and the single-species 
models. These signs can probably be explained by distinguishing between net buyers and net 
sellers of quotas. For the quota price, the sign of the coefficient to the non-lagged variable is 
negative, whereas the sign to the lagged variable is positive in both Tables 5 and 6. These signs can 
also be explained by distinguishing between quota selling and buying. Thus, in total, the signs in 
front of the neoclassical variables and capital market frictions become reasonably theoretically 
consistent when lagged variables are included. Therefore, judged by the signs of the included 
variables, the dynamic investment model in section 2 seems reasonable.   
Regarding the statistical significance of the neoclassical variables, we see from Table 5 that none 
of the variables are significant in the multi-species model, whereas only the non-lagged total 
harvest of sole is significant in the single-species model. For the capital market frictions in the 
multi-species model (Table 5), both the lagged quota and quota price are significant in Pooled. 
However, in the single-species model, both the non-lagged and lagged quotas are significant in 
Within, together with the lagged quota price. For the additional variables, vessel tonnage is 
significant in both Tables 5 and 6 as in the models without lags in Tables 3 and 4, whereas the 
lagged value of the profit is insignificant as in section 5.1.    
As in section 5.1, the pulse dummy is highly statistically significant in all four models. Thus, we can 
conclude that vessels undertaking pulse fishing invest significantly more than vessels conducting 
conventional fishing, even when we include lagged values of some of the neoclassical variables 
and capital market frictions. Concerning economic significance, vessels undertaking pulse fishing 
28 
 
invest between 56,786 EURO and 133.228 EURO more than vessels conducting conventional 
fishing. Furthermore, the sizes of the additional investments by vessels undertaking pulse fishing 
in the models with and without lags are in line with each other (comparing the results in section 
5.1. and in this section). Thus, from the point of view of economic significance, it does not matter 
whether we include lagged variables. In total, these results indicate that the benefit of being a 
fisherman is higher in the pulse fishery than in the conventional fishery. However, the positive and 
significant pulse dummy can also be due to omitted neoclassical variables and capital market 
frictions represented by, for example, differences in the expected future returns between fleet 
segments.    
Four additional conclusions can be summarized with respect to the models with lagged variables. 
First, by comparing Tables 3 and 4 with Tables 5 and 6, we see that there is a slight increase in R2 
when lagged values of the independent variables are included. However, R2 is still fairly low, so 
even when including lagged variables, a low amount of the variation in the investments is 
explained. Second, from Tables 5 and 6, we also see that the p-value on the FE-test in both models 
is high.36 Thus, a fixed effect model does not seem to be necessary, and we can operate with 
identical constant terms for all vessels in the four models (apart from the pulse dummy). Third, for 
the Chow-test, the p-value is low in all four models.37 Thus, it seems likely that the estimated 
parameters will differ between pulse and conventional fishing, indicating that the investment 
functions are structurally different. Finally, as in section 5.1, the pulse dummy becomes 
insignificant if the non-pulse related investments are used as a dependent variable. This indicates 
that vessels conducting pulse fishing invest more because of the fishing gear used.    
6 Conclusions.  
A common observation in actual fisheries is that the return on capital differs considerably 
between fleet segments, but according to conventional neoclassical theory, investments should be 
allocated such that the return on capital becomes identical for all vessels. One implication of 
neoclassical theory is that investments in various fleet segments can be explained by several key 
economic variables. Alternatives to neoclassical theory are: a. modern neoclassical theory, in 
                                                            
36 0.73 and 0.33. 
37 0.001, 0.003, 0.068 and 0.005. 
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which capital market frictions partly explain investments, and b. preference-based theory, where 
fishermen obtain a separate benefit from investing. Both alternative theories offer an explanation 
for why the return on capital may differ between fleet segments. 
In this paper, we have investigated which factors can explain investments in the Dutch beam 
trawler fishery in the North Sea. By using a theoretical model, we derived a number of neoclassical 
variables, capital market frictions and preference-based variables that potentially may affect 
investments. In the empirical models we measure the preference-based variable with a pulse 
dummy measuring whether a vessel undertaking pulse or conventional fishing.  
We have undertaken a number of estimations where relevant neoclassical variables, capital 
market frictions and the pulse dummy variable are included. Specifically, we a. estimated 
multispecies and single-species models using output prices, quota prices, harvest and quotas for 
both all species and sole, b. estimated models with OLS and fixed effects and c. estimated models 
with and without lagged values of the independent variables. In all the estimated models, the 
pulse dummy is highly statistically and economically significant, whereas most of the neoclassical 
variables and capital market frictions are statistically insignificant. One implication of this result is 
that a fisherman may obtain a separate benefit of investing in pulse fishing because that method is 
perceived as more environmentally friendly.  However, the positive and significant pulse dummy 
can also be due to differences in omitted neoclassical variables and capital market frictions. In 
particular, the significant dummy variable may be due to differences in expectations to future 
returns in pulse and conventional fishing.   
For all the models, we have also tried to use non-pulse related investments instead of total 
investments including pulse related investments as a dependent variable. In all these estimations, 
the pulse dummy turns out to be insignificant, which indicates that vessels conducting pulse 
fishing may invest more because of the type of gear used. However, this issue must be further 
investigated, and therefore conducting empirical studies to investigate explanations for 
differences in investments between fleet segments is an important area for future research.   
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